In The Transcendence of the Eqo, Sartre denies that there can be a transcendental ego in the Husserjian sense or in any sense resembling the Husserlian one.
The ego, he says, is an object for, not a content in consciousness. Consequently, Sartre does not regard the ego as having the status of a pure, disengaged consciousness which would remain intact after all implicit, but questionable presuppositions, had been bracketed out by means of the phenomenological reduction. Rather, in Sartre's view the character and identity of the ego becomes uncertain and nebulous as a result of the reduction. This denial of the subjectively conscious transcendental ego then becomes one of the basic tenets of the worldview he develops in Being and Nothingness.
I shall suggest, however, that such a denial puts the whole phenomenological movement in jeopardy t>y needlessly removing an essential element from its methodological foundation.
The goal is to restore this element.
According
to Husserl, (1) the transcendental ego consists ontologically of our immediate consciousness in its subjective purity; because this immediate consciousness remains unaffected by the phenomenological reduction, it is transcendental (Husserl, . At the same time, (2) "One consciousness is bound up with another so as to constitute one consciousness, of which the correlate is one noema" (Husserl, p. 307) . Husserl credits the "unity of the immanent time-consciousness" with this accomplishment of "(binding) consciousness with consciousness" (Husserl, p. 307) . Because of this essential unity, pure consciousness has the structure of an ego, and not a mere succession of transcendental "consciousnesses."
It is both transcendental and an egoa transcendental ego.
Sartre considers it impossible that the same immanent consciousness as reduced can be both transcendental and an ego.
He begins with Eugen Fink's thesis that the reflecting 4 and the reflected-upon "I" can never be identical.
The reflecting "I" is not immanently given in the act of reflection, but only the object of this reflection (the reflected "I," the "me") is given; and ] 48 this object, the "me," can never serve as subject-pole for a phenomenological reduction, for the obvious reason that, as reflected upon, it is an object. It stands outside the brackets of the reduction, just as does any scientific or historical claim.
Essentially, then, says Sartre, if the transcendental ego cannot be immediately given to me in any of the particular moments of my consciousness, then it is nothing but a hypothetical construct which is both unknowable and unnecessary; but, on the other hand, if the ego could be given in some actual moment of consciousness, then it would no longer be the transcending unifier of all these moments of consciousness, but would be merely the content of one of them. This directionality . of the immediate experience, which is experienced as such when we focus on the subjective meaning of the experience (the noesis), gives the subject of the experience a more direct affinity with the immediately preceding and. the immediately following experiences than it could ever have with a mere object of experience.
Sartre can ignore this point only by failing to take adeguate account of the impossiblility in principle of there ever being experienced an exact present moment in the stream of consciousness. To experience an exact "now" in the temporal dimension would be analogous to experiencing a figure without a ground in the spacial dimension. Even the closest we could conceivably come to experiencing a "now" would reveal itself as already having part of its meaning inseparably bound up either with the immediately preceding moment, or the immediately following. And because of this inherently time-consuming character of even the simplest experience (which Sartre of course does not deny ), it becomes possible for consciousness to reflect on an essential aspect of itself, without thereby reducing itself or this aspect of itself to an object external to its own reflection. With regard to the danger of psychologism, we must also show that this subjectively-sensed meaning which immanently discloses the direction of consciousness in its unfolding is the residuum of a phenomenological and not a psychological reduction, which it is, precisely because the reduction produces a coincidence between human and transcendental consciousness In the particular instant when the reduction is accomplished.
Furthermore, "I," the human being who performs the reduction, prereflectively already was essentially my transcendental ego.
The argument then hinges on the question: Must we equate "reflection" by definition with making oneself into an object, or is it possible for "me," as my ongoing process of relatively unified experience, to "reflect" on the immanent consciousness (which has and can subjectively experience itself as having this directional aspect) in some other way than by making it into an intentional object?
If so, then to focus on a "moment" in the flow as inherently meaningful only in terms of other moments, is to disclose, in however limited a fashion, the Husserlian transcendental ego. Who are "we," as subjects performing the meaning-and validity-accomplishment of universal constitution?
Can "we" mean "we human beings," human beings in the natural-objective sense, i.e., as real entities in the world?
But are these real entities not themselves "phenomena" and as such themselves object-poles and subject matter for inquiry back into the correlative intentionalities of which they are the poles, through whose function they have and have attained their ontic meaning?
If transendental subjectivity ultimately disengages itself from the real, psychophysical entity that "I" Since Husserl says that all attention is intentional, however, then to become attentively aware of a consciousness which is already there is to make this consciousness into the intentional object of this attentive awareness, which means that insofar as I am attentively aware of a nonintentional consciousness (such as the non-positional self-consciousness of the transcendental ego), the latter is no longer a content in consciousness at all, but becomes the object of consciousness. As Husserl himself articulates in his lectures on time conscioxisness, "What is caused to appear in the moment-actual [MomentanAktuellen] of the flux of consciousness is the past phase of the flux of consciousness in the series of retentional moments of this flux."
The essential injustice of interpreting this statement as meaning that phenomenological reflection reduces the reflected-upon consciousness to an intentional object can be seen in Sartre's theory of emotion, v/hich seems to follow from the assumption of strictly universal intentional!ty.
• But fear is not originally consciousness of being afraid, no more than the perception of this book is consciousness of perceiving the book .... Emotional consciousness is, first of all, consciousness of the world .... Thermotion is a certain manner of apprehending the world.
But it is for this very reason that Husserl allows consciousness to be directly and non-intentionally conscious of itself in the sense of its pure fluxcharacter as revealed simply in the experience of directionality and already-ongoingness. If we assume a doctrine of radical transcendence such as the one Sartre expresses in his analysis of emotions, then it would be difficult to understand why it is that I take up this particular motivational stance toward the world as opposed to so many other motivational positions I could have taken up, and which ultimately would have resulted in different emotions. The teleological or emotional (and therefore temporal) directedness constituting my basic motivations and influencing in this way my interpretation of reality (through perspectival limitation, "bad faith," etc.) cannot be so reduced to consciousness of some object. If the motivation is not originary, but is rather a second order property of a perception, then there would be no way to account for the fact that what we see is always already motivated by our designation of the important parameters to look for as we bring phenomena into focus (the important Kantian influence on Husserl's Ideas).
If it is true that we to some extent selectively attend to just those intentional objects to which it is convenient for us to attend (in our mundane consciousness), and ignore objects which it is convenient .156 to ignore, then the motivational stance out of which I implicitly decide to attend to this while ignoring that (a motivational stance therefore partly constitutive of my perspectival limitations and category structures) must be logically prior to the decision in question. This perspectival limitation has an important role in choosing which objects to make thematic. The motivational stance which influences the perspectival limitation in this way may well be intentional in a sense, but in another sense it cannot be. It is conscious on the level of "lookingfor" rather than "looking-at." In the same way, it is possible for the human person to "become" his own alreadyfunctioning transcendental unity, without thereby making the subjectivity previously at work in that unification into an object.
We must clarify what we mean by this "looking-for" kind of intentionality.
Consider the example of a man who is told to check through a stack of tickets for all the ones numberd "7": He may not really see the other numbers besides 7, but may only see in each case whether the number he glances at is or is not a seven. To a certain extent, we see only the aspects of phenomena we are interested in, and we come to an experience equipped with categories that reflect our interests.
Categorial intentionality (as we shall call this broader type of intentionality) functions to facilitate experiencing, precisely by_ limiting it.
If we had to approach the world without categorial intentions, we could never make enough "inferences": from "sense data" to organize our experience meaningfully. The distinction is not merely between being presentatively aware of a generality of meaning, and being presentatively aware of a more specific fulfillment of that meaning. Rather, the meaning-intention is a looking-for the fulfillment of a certain experienced meaning, whereas the presentative-intention which fulfills this meaningintention is a looking-at the object that fulfills the meaning.
The word "intend" in the two cases describes an entirely different functional relation to the object.
For Husserl, of course, the meaning-intention is itself a presentative intention having the pure species as its obejct. But, in principle this presentative meaningintention itself presupposes some, other, prior categorial intention or looking-for which would lead me to look at and to grasp the essence of the species in question. And When I look at this looking-for, I find that some other looking-for must have led me to be interested in making this apprehension as opposed to others 1 could have made instead.
Every presentative intention (whether ' of an individual or of a species) is a figure which presupposes as its ground a categorial (more general and "lookingfor") intention. This movement from categorial to presentative intentionality is one instance wherein the i r>7 moment-transcending quality öf experiencing makes itself self-evident in reflection, without becoming an intention object in its own right.
The intentionality (if any) accompanying such a way of experiencing must be a very broadened kind, and certainly not the narrower mode of looking-at. And at the same time, it must be the hyletic phase to which Husserl points when he says, Not every real phase of the concrete unity of an intentional experience has itself the basic character of intentionality, the property of being a "consciousness of something." This is the case, for instance, with all sensory data, which play so great a part in the perceptive intuition of things . . The content which presents the whiteness of the paper as it appears to us . . . is the bearer of an intentionality, but not itself a consciousness of something.
The same holds of other data of experience^ of the so-called sensory feelings, for instance.
There must be a variety of instances in the experiencing process wherein I am able to be conscious of the on-going experiencing process subjectively, and not merely by •reflecting on it in an objectifying sense, which would make it the object for some other state of my consciousness to inspect as if from a distance; otherwise it would never be possible to feel anything at all, but merely to be presentatively aware that I was feeling or had been feeling some way, which would be absured if I did not in fact feel that way.
The question remains, can we apply these concepts to Sartre's argument against the transcendental ego? "Ego," for both Sartre and Husserl, implies the transcending unity across time of the many moment-actuals comprising the stream of consciousness. Sartre says that the transcendental "1" would have to be either the direct consciousness of this moment, or a transcending unity which "has" all of these particular feelings.
If I am the former, then the transcendence across -time cannot be explained; if the latter, then "I" would not myself be a consciousness, since all the states of consciousness would be ontologically distinguished from what "1" am.
However, it would seem that there is the possibility, in fact the necessity, that I am both.
In the directional experience of the "looking-for," for example, 1 am this motivation to see, which at the same time is already felt on the one hand (thus it is a concrete consciousness), yet on the other hand also unifies all the other consciousnesses of the intentional complex by motivating the order and pattern in which my circumspective gaze looks around in its looking-for and therefore also in its looking-at. One unitary source, from which this gaze ultimately takes its direction, at the same time that it is consciousness of a transcendent object, can also be directly conscious of itself (as having the character of a directional, on-going process).
In the naturalistic viewpoint, when I live primarily in the looking-at which results from the process, this self-consciousness is nonthetic and prereflective.
(It is also possible to look at myself in this objectifying way, but then no coincidence is guaranteed between the human and the transcendental "self.") But if this always-presupposed "looking-for" categorial intentionality should choose to involve itself in a phenomenological reduction, to just this extent I become aware of the hooks and arrows connecting my seemingly objective worldview with the prior interestmotivated pattern in the systematic direction of attention, that is, with my category structure or perspectival limitation. The perspectival limitation, which is now part of the directly felt subjectivity of the time during which this experience takes place, becomes conscious of itself.
Then in the instant when this limited category structure attends to itself intentionally, it automatically changes: At least some of the prejudice which formerly limited it (and which it formerly was, being its own limitation through selective attention) is now in the process of dropping away. And precisely in this experiencing of the change in our perspective, we experience consciousness itself as having a direction, from something to something (and these somethings themselves are not at this moment experienced as isolated moments of consciousness, but as further-away segments of the same flow). We then see that its meaning cannot be described in terms of an immediate "now" which in reality is only an abstraction. The experience, rather, exhibits the unity of a flow from one perspective to another, and this flow-which is both unifying and directly experienceable-is the transcendental ego.
We do not therefore conclude that "I," in the instant that I become conscious of myself as my 
